THE O'MEARA CASE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION HOUSING LAWS
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*

N 1957, Washington joined more than a dozen states which have
resolved to eliminate racial discrimination from publicly-assisted
housing.' Having determined that demonstrations of prejudice menaced the legitimate aspiration of Negro citizens to secure shelter
according to their needs and ability to pay, the legislature declared
it to be unlawful for "the owner of publicly-assisted housing to refuse
to sell, rent, or lease to any person . . . because of the race, creed,
color, or national origin of such person ....
Enforcement of the
law was entrusted to an administrative agency,3 and "publicly-assisted
housing" was defined to include housing "financed in whole or in part
by a loan, whether or not secured by a mortgage, the repayment of
which is guaranteed or insured by the federal government or any
agency thereof, or the state or any of its political subdivisions . . .,
In the first case to reach a superior court under the 1957 statute,
Washington's maiden effort to protect its citizens from housing discrimination was declared unconstitutional.' Because the result was
seemingly at odds with two similar cases in New York and New
Jersey,' and because housing statutes in a number of states were im*"'
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1 For reference to these laws and a discussion of their significance, see McEntire,
Residence and Race 266-67 (1960) ; Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 304-12,
390 (1959); IV Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights-Housing 120132 (1961); Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights 399 (1959);
Forster and Rabkin, The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly
Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38 (1960).
2 Wash. Rev. Code, § 49.60 as amended by Wash. L. 1957, c. 37.
3 For an assessment of the success of administrative agencies in the enforcement of
state anti-discrimination laws, see Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961).
4 Wash. Rev. Code, supra note 2.
5 O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, No. 535996 (Wash.
Super. Ct., King Cty., July 31, 1959), 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 682 (1959).
6 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc., 10
Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Levitt & Sons v. Division Against Discrimination, 56 N.J. Super. 542, 153 A.2d 700 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 514, 158
A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
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periled by the rationale of the Washington superior court,' the
judgment attracted widespread comment. Interestingly, the law journal responses were unanimously critical of Judge Hodson's analysis.8
The authors of a recent book-largely devoted to a study of state
laws against discrimination-felt it unnecessary even to dignify the
opinion with detailed criticism; instead, they dismissed the case in
the following laconic footnote:
We have deliberately omitted any discussion of O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination... because Judge Hodson's
decision in that case... is predicated upon an unsound theory and
should be reversed on appeal. 9

The sanguinity of the authors was only partly justified. The
lower court had invalidated the statute on three grounds: (a) it was
unconstitutional because it applied to some housing not within the
compass of "state action" under the 14th Amendment; (b) it denied
equal protection because it arbitrarily subjected owners of publiclyassisted housing to a legal duty not imposed on unassisted owners;
(c) it violated the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution. On review, the state supreme court made no mention of the
first of Judge Hodson's three propositions, three members of the
supreme court approved his reasoning with respect to the equal protection issue while doing little more than quoting verbatim from his
opinion, five combined to produce a majority for affirmance solely
on the strength of the local law issue, and four judges dissented.' 0
The critics were correct, then, to the extent that Judge Hodson's
7 See note 1, supra. The majority of these statutes are limited to publicly-assisted
housing.
8 See, e.g., Forster and Rabkin, The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38, 48-57 (1960); McGhee and Ginger,
The House I Live In-A Study of Housing for Minorities, 46 Cornell L.Q. 194, 235-36
(1961); Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526, 583 (1961) ; Note, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 758,
772-74 (1960); Robison, Housing-The Northern Civil Rights Frontier, 13 W. Res. L.
Rev. 101, 121-23 (see esp. n. 102) (1961).
9 Konvitz and Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights 248 (1961). The chapter containing
this footnote is abscribed to Mr. Leskes.
10 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961). Certiorari was sought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(3) (1958), but denied by the Supreme Court. 369 U.S. 839 (1962). It may
not have been merely coincidental that the state supreme court majority ultimately
turned the result on a state constitutional issue, thus effectively insulating the
decision from Supreme Court review. See Fox Film Corporation v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207
(1935), and editorial comment on the denial of certiorari in the O'Meara case in N.Y.
Times, April 3, 1962, p. 28, col. 1. Certainly it is entirely clear that denial of certiorari
was in no respect an approval of the result reached by the Washington courts: "The
Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of
errors in lower court decisions." Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 S. Ct. V (1949).
(An address to the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949.) For a capable study of
problems created by this practice, i.e., the practice of state courts attaching an independent local law basis to sustain the result regardless of the federal questions involved, see
Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1375 (1961).
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view of the 14th Amendment failed to command a majority on any
issue. Reduced to dicta, and currently offset by four state supreme
court decisions which are substantially opposed," the mischievous
rendering of the 14th Amendment and the impact of the case in other
jurisdictions which must still review their own similar statutes, should
be slight. Nevertheless, the case is disheartening for three reasons.
First, it represents a regression in Washington for the elimination of
second class citizenship in housing, not only in striking down the
statute, but in doing so in such a fashion as to confuse legislators
who might hereafter seek to remedy the supposed defects. Second,
by exhibiting the judiciary's unreadiness to support local efforts to
solve community problems at the state level, the case enhances the
prospect for federal intervention by way of executive order 2 or
judicial extension of the 14th Amendment1--alternatives which
those convinced of the wisdom of local responsibility do not relish.' 4
Third, it is discouraging to students of constitutional law as an unhappy reflection on the constitutional scholarship of the Washington
courts.
Two of these criticisms may be spurned as based on value judgments which the reader is not inclined to share. The third is intended
as a more serious indictment of professional judgment. It rests on the
following bases.
Judge Hodson held that the statute would unconstitutionally
exceed Washington's legislative prerogatives if it were not confined
to situations where "state action" within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment was involved:
11 For the New York and New Jersey cases, see note 6, supra. Since O'Meara, the
California Supreme Court has upheld a similar statute against an equal protection argument, agreeing with Pelham Hall and* Levitt, and expressly rejecting the rationale of
O'Meara. Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 30 U.S.L. Week 2467 (April 3, 1962). In
a well-reasoned opinion subsequent to its own Levitt case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court explicitly repudiated the O'Meara case. Jones v. Haridor Realty Co., - N.J. -,
181 A.2d 481 (1962).
12 Such an order has been urged on the President by the United States Commission
on Civil Rights in 1959 and in 1961. See both Reports at note 1, supra, pp. 537-40 and
150-53 respectively. The order has been prepared and is currently awaiting the President's
signature.
13 The constitutional rationale for such an extension already exists. See, e.g., Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Garner v. Louisiana, 82 S. Ct. 248 (1962) (concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th cir. 1956); Ming v. Horgan,
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 693 (Super. Ct. Calif. 1958). Additionally, some writers have concluded that "state action" was never intended to be a limitation on federal authority to
eliminate private discrimination. Harris, The Quest for Equality (1960); Frank & Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 131,
168 (1950).
14 For a review of local responsibility in 14th Amendment interpretation, and reference to citations, see Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 14-22, 3436, 41-44, 46-57 (1961).
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In order to be constitutional, the act in question must satisfy the
notion of "state action."
The state here, in order to prevail, must demonstrate that the complainant Jones lies within the ambit of the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.... However, the 14th Amendment proscribes only state action. 15
The cases cited for these astonishing propositions were cases which
did not involve state laws at all. Rather, they involved only the
self-enforcing effect of the 14th and 5th Amendments unaided by
any legislation, 6 and federal statutes wherein congressional power
was circumscribed by section 5 of the 14th Amendment.' That the
police power of the state to discourage discrimination is not coterminous with the power of Congress under the 14th Amendment, is
perfectly clear. Thus, while Congress may not prohibit private discrimination in employment, education, housing, public accommodations,
etc.,' 8 the states have traditionally done so as a wholly proper exercise of their police power. 9 Equally, while Congress is without authority to enter into comprehensive zoning of private property-restricting
private land use to certain purposes and authorizing others-yet the
exercise of zoning power is thoroughly orthodox for the states."0
These differences in the ambit of legislative power are obviously not
based on a distinction that the states are not affecting "property
rights" (as the court seemed to intimate), for clearly they are. The
difference is simply the well settled one that congressional authority
finds its source solely in constitutional delegations, while state authority is bottomed on the sovereignty of the state to enact police regula15 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, No. 535996 (Wash.
Super. Ct., King Cty., July 31, 1959), 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 682, 686 (1959), aff'd,
58 Wash.2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
16 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
The Boiling case, concerning school segregation in the District of Columbia, technically
arose under the 5th Amendment rather than the 14th, although the Supreme Court has
viewed the respective coverages of both Amendments as substantially equivalent in
matters of race relations and equal protection.
17 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
18 Ibid. See also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Corrigan v. Buckley,
.271 U.S. 323 (1926); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) ; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) ; United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
19 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v.
Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) and see the cases reviewed in works cited in notes 8 and
9, supra; esp. the article by Robison at nn. 86-92; Note, U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 525-533
(1959) ; Ross and Freedman, The Constitutionality of a Bill Prohibiting Discrimination
in Housing, 18 Law. Guild Rev. 30 (1958); Note, 45 Va. L. Rev. 428 (1959).
20 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (concerning police power of Congress in the District of
Columbia).
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they are reasonably
tions of whatever kind it desires, so long as
2
related to the public welfare of the community. '
Since the elimination of racial discrimination is a legitimate
concern of government, the only federal question for the court to
decide was whether the means of elimination selected by the Washington legislature were reasonably related to that end. Judge Hodson did
not deny that enforcement of the anti-discrimination law would have
the desired effect of eliminating some discrimination. Rather, he
took the view that the law was necessarily arbitrary since it applied
only to those who received some public assistance in securing their
homes. In the seemingly persuasive language of the court, the vice of
the law was this:
There is no reason to suppose that persons with FHA mortgages
on their homes are more likely to discriminate against minority
groups than those who have conventional mortgages or no mortgages, or those who are purchasing upon contract. This act would
from doing what his neighbors are
prohibit Commander O'Meara
22
at perfect liberty to do.

Concluding that there could be no rational basis for this kind of unequal treatment of home owners, Judge Hodson and three members
of the supreme court concluded that the law was invalid under the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
Two questions are involved here. First, are there no rational
bases to support the state's differentiation between publicly-assisted
and unassisted home owners? Second, assuming we find that some
rational bases for such a distinction can be advanced, how substantial
must they be in order to survive the requirements of the equal protection clause? As to the reasonableness of prohibiting discrimination in
publicly-assisted housing while leaving private housing unaffected,
surely the following distinctions are of some relevance:
(a). Legislation is generally called upon to respond to human
needs which are substantial and pressing. Moreover, it is desirable that
a law be.tailored to the essential problem which occasioned it, for the
law necessarily vindicates the interests of some persons at the expense
of others, whether we are considering an anti-discrimination statute,
a zoning ordinance, a trade regulation, or something else; in this sense,
the law is never "neutral," because it necessarily places the power of
government behind some interests or values in preference to others. 3
21 Compare cases cited in note 18 with respect to limitations on congressional power
with those cited in notes 19 and 20. See also, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 1133 (1876).
22 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. at 688; 365 P.2d at 5.
23 Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1959), with Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1961);
Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Chi. L.
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The preservation of competing interests, compatible with protection
of those persons whose special need called up the law, provides a
reasonable basis for confining the law to the protection of that
special need. If the substance of a given problem can be met by a
limited law, it would be a novel demand to insist that less substantial
problems of the same general type must also be treated identically as
a condition of constitutionality.
An ordinance requiring that dogs be kept on leashes while outside
the yards of their owners is illustrative. The pupose of such a law is to
protect the public from the nuisance and harm which some unleashed
dogs may cause. Yet, seldom are such laws drafted so as to apply
equally to domesticated raccoons or ocelots, even though there is no
evidence to suggest that these animals are individually less of a
nuisance if not restrained, and even though there is no evidence that
raccoon and ocelot owners are more diligent in confining their pets
to their own yards. Abstractly, it is discriminatory to impose a duty
on dog owners without imposing a similar duty on raccoon and
ocelot owners who may be equally irresponsible as individuals. Would
we therefore expect a judge, reviewing the applicability of the ordinance
to a dog owner, to invalidate it with a paraphrase of the O'Meara
court:
There is no reason to suppose that owners of dogs are more likely
to let them run loose than owners of ocelots or owners of raccoons.
This act would prohibit the defendant dog owner from doing what
his raccoon and ocelot owning neighbors are at perfect liberty to do.
But of course the 14th Amendment does not require a foolish and
"abstract symmetry" 2 4 of this kind; it is enough that the ordinance
corrects the problem of animal nuisances in a substantial fashion,
where the problem is most acute for the public which needs some
protection, and not that it embrace other nuisances which are collectively, although not individually, less offensive. The reasonable legislative distinction between dog owners and raccoon and ocelot owners
is therefore not that the former are more likely to turn their animals
loose, but that with respect to the problem which occasioned the law,
the latter are quantitatively less of a nuisance.
This aesopian illustration finds its analogy in the legislative
distinction made by Washington between unassisted and publiclyassisted home owners. The interest of the protected class, Negroes
and other minorities adversely affected by discrimination, is substantially greater with respect to publicly-assisted housing generally
Rev. 661 (1960); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957).
24 See text at note 37, infra.
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than with respect to wholly private housing. Public assistance is
provided to stimulate low-cost housing available to families of modest
means. Thus, PHA facilities are commonly limited to low-income
groups,2" FNMA insurance is unavailable on loans exceeding $15,000,26
and FHA and VA insurance are designed to insure private lenders
against economic risks commonly associated with low-income groups
subject to unstable employment conditions.27 Negroes are predominant
in both low income and unstable employment categories, and therefore should tend to be among the principal beneficiaries of publiclyassisted housing vis-4-vis privately financed housing, when it becomes
available on a non-discriminatory basis. Median family income for
Negroes in 1959 was $2,917, or only 52% of white family income.2 8
Similarly, in periods of recession Negroes are more substantially
affected than are whites; in the trough of the recent downturn of
1960-61, nonwhite unemployment rose to 13.9% compared with 6.9%
for whites.19 Symptomatic of economic disparities, enormously aggravated by discriminations, is the fact that nearly three times as many
Negroes as whites live in substandard houses.3" And while Negroes
have not proportionately benefited from FHA insured housing under
the current federal policy of allowing the developer or buyer to discriminate, 3 1 44% of all publicly established housing units which are
operated on an open occupancy basis are occupied by Negroes, 2
even though nonwhites comprise but 11.1% of the total population. 3
Since FHA-insured and other publicly-assisted housing is designed
to alleviate the housing needs of the kind most critically experienced
by Negroes, it is perfectly reasonable that the Washington legislature
should first direct its attention to publicly-assisted housing of this
sort. Since the need for housing on an open occupancy basis is less
acute with respect to wholly private houses in terms of price, quantity,
See McEntire, Residence and Race 316-17 (1960).
Id. at 309.
27 Thus, the innovation of long term loans, high loan-to-value ratios, and the
inclusion of a wife's income in judging qualification-all previously foreign to private
institutions. IV Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights-Housing 14,
66 (1961).
28 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports-Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 35 page 23, Table 2 (January 5, 1961).
29 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Monthly Report on the Labor
Force 7 (April, 1961).
30 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights 343 (1959).
31 For discussions of this policy, see McEntire, pp. 290-314, 347-355; IV Report on
United States Commission on Civil Rights--Housing 9-26 (1961). The six volumes of
the Commission on Race and Housing, published by the University of California Press
in 1960, provide what is perhaps the most comprehensive and current study made of the
general problem.
32 McEntire, op. cit. supra note 25, at p. 315.
a3 Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 8, 26 (1961).
25
26
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and ability to purchase, surely it is not unreasonable for the legislature to have left them unaffected in its very first attempt to deal
with the problem!
(b). The interest of the white property holder in his freedom
of choice to sell or not to sell is directly related to the measure of
public assistance he has received and also provides a basis for distinguishing him from his unassisted counterpart. A man whose home is
solely the result of his own labor, earnings, and savings might reasonably be vouchsafed a greater voice in how "his" house shall be
used than, say, one who has invested comparatively little of his own
time, energy, and savings but was provided with a home by somebody else, in this case, the state, through urban renewal, or the federal government, through FHA or PHA. For the state of Washington
to determine that there is less reason to allow publicly-assisted home
owners from exercising their prerogative to demonstrate prejudice
towards other citizens of Washington than to allow owners whose
homes represent entirely their own finances to do so, justifiably responds to the difference between the groups in the extent of involvement of their legitimate "private" interests.
(c). The responsibility of the state to make certan that public
funds are not used so as to perpetuate racial discrimination is arguably greater than its responsibility to make certain that private funds
are not so used. This argument is partly a corollary to the immediately
preceding one. Spelled out, it amounts to this: FHA, PHA, and
urban renewal funds are raised by the state and federal government
through taxation of all the people, Negroes and whites alike. A
sense of fairness requires that the state should not permit the use of
public funds, some of which are contributed by Negroes, in a manner
which hurts some of the very people who contributed these funds.
When the state uses public funds to provide a white person with a
home, and then allows that person to discriminate against some of
the people who contributed the funds which made his home ownership possible, it is in some measure a breach of trust by the state,
an abrogation of its responsibilities. Thus, for Washington to determine that public assistance shall not be used by its recipients to
discriminate, while leaving other home owners who received no such
assistance free to exercise an independent judgment, may rest on a
reasonable distinction.
(d). Both the New York and New Jersey courts relied upon
a "step-at-a-time" rationale to support anti-discrimination laws which
did not embrace all private housing."4 The courts felt that it was
34 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc., 10
Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Levitt & Sons v. Division Against Dis-
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reasonable for a state legislature to approach a given social problem
diffidently, attempting to correct it in stages, and to wait to determine
what additional measures might be required. Most of the critics
of the O'Meara case felt that this alone would support the classification employed by the Washington legislature.3
(e). As noted in the fairly comprehensive article by Arnold
Forster and Sol Rabkin, 0 limiting the effect of the law to publiclyassisted housing may also be reasonable because it is realistic in that
it provides a more efficient means for enforcing the law, drawing upon
the involvement of the FHA and lending institutions to secure its
observance. Any of these bases to distinguish the separate treatment
of publicly-assisted from unassisted home owners might be persuasive.
Collectively, they appear quite compelling, deserving at least of some
attention by the courts.
But even assuming that these distinctions are only mildly persuasive as to the reasonableness of distinguishing publicly-assisted
from unassisted home owners, are they not at least sufficient to meet
the demands of the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause? The
answer proceeds, ironically enough, from the very case on which
37
Judge Hodson himself purportedly relied, Patsone v. Pennsylvania.
The case involved an alien who contested the constitutionality of a
state law which prohibited the killing of wild game by unnaturalized
foreign-born residents, and which enforced the prohibition by making
the possession or ownership of a shot gun -or rifle by unnaturalized
foreign-born residents a misdemeanor. The statute did not apply
to anyone else, however, and thus the defendant introduced the same
argument which was to be repeated forty-four years later by Commander O'Meara, i.e., that the statute denied equal protection in
that it arbitrarily imposed restrictions on a few persons without
imposing similar restrictions on others who were indistinguishable
in their likelihood to commit the offense. There was no evidence to
crimination, 56 N.J. Super. 542, 153 A.2d 700 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 514, 158
A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 80 Sup. Ct. 1257 (1960). That proscriptions of racial discrimination in publicly-assisted housing are not necessarily meant to be a legislature's
final effort in the field is indicated by the recent extension of the New York City Ordinance to cover a substantial amount of private housing as well. See 5 N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § X41 (Supp. 1961) ; 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 877 (1961). State laws presently reaching
beyond publicly-assisted housing include those of Colorado, Connecticut,. Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Oregon. McEntire, Residence and Race 266-68 (1960); 6 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 1187 (1961).
35 See, e.g., Forster and Rabkin, The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38, 56-57 (1960); McGhee and Ginger,
The House I Live In-A Study of Housing for Minorities, 46 Cornell L.Q. 194, 233-35
(1961).
36 Op. cit. supra.
37 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
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offset defendant's argument, but Justice Holmes nevertheless affirmed
the conviction for a near-unanimous Court, employing the following
language:
A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a
practical one dependent upon experience. The demand for symmetry ignores the specific difference that experience is supposed to
have shown to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the law
that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter
of fact,38it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class
named.

The lack of evidence distinguishing the affected class of persons from
the unaffected class, and the boldness of Justice Holmes' position,
make the decision more than sufficient to sustain the Washington
statute. While there were dicta to mitigate the rigor of the phrase
just quoted,3 9 and while the Supreme Court has required more by way
of reasonable classification in other contexts,4 ° the Patsone case has
generally been followed.4
Thus, in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 2 a municipal

regulation forbade the use of panelled, business delivery vehicles for
commercial advertising, but made an exception where the advertisement was connected with the business of the trucking company itself.
Plaintiff attacked the ordinance as a denial of equal protection, persuasively asserting that the classification was arbitrary in view of
the purpose of the law to lessen traffic hazards by reducing eyecatching distractions; vehicles advertising their own products were
no less likely to distract attention than vehicles advertising the
products of other businesses. Moreover, distractions provided by
fixed displays along the streets of New York, most notably the garish
signs in Times Square, presented at least as substantial a hazard as
panel advertisements, compounding the apparent unreasonableness of
the classification and arbitrarily depriving plaintiff of prospective
profits in using his trucks for advertising purposes. Nevertheless, the
Court sustained the statute, deferring to the city's legislative judgment,
and employing language followed in the Levitt and Pelham Hall cases
but disregarded in O'Meara:
38 Id. at 144 [Emphasis added.]

39 Ibid.
40 See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Hartford
Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937); McCabe v. Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151
(1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
41 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goeseaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S, 464 (1948); Kotch v.
Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
42 Op. cit. supra.
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that all evils of the same
It is no requirement of equal protection
43
genus be eradicated or none at all.
The problem has its analogues in virtually every field including
that of zoning, where property owners have complained that equal
protection was denied where similar property situated elsewhere in
the same community was not similarly zoned.44 As observed by one
writer when infant zoning laws were receiving their baptism in the

courts:
As for the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, though
it is discussed in some cases, no ordinance seems to have been invalidated for discriminatory treatment of different sections of the
city or of different lots within a district. The principle, that a
measure does not violate the equality clause simply because the
legislation does not cover the whole possible field of the subject, has
been applied to zoning ordinances, as, for instance, the holding that
an ordinance is not unconstitutional for excluding laundries from
while not excluding them from other districts similarly
one district
45
situated.
One need not entirely agree with the resolution of these cases
and their gingerly treatment of the equal protection clause to conclude
that the O'Meara courts erred in failing to account for them. Nor
need one take his stand on the argument that the equal protection
clause demands very little to support differences established by way
of legislative treatment in cases of this kind, for surely the reasons we
have previously reviewed to support the difference in treatment under
the Washington statute were quite substantial. And finally, were we
to concede that the case was in fact a close one, it might have been more
consistent with judicial enlightenment to resolve the doubt according to
these felicitous expressions of Justice Frankfurter:
We have here a prohibition of discrimination ... on account of race,
creed, or color. A judicial determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a distortion of the policy
Of course a State may leave
manifested in that amendment ....
abstention from such discrimination to the conscience of individuals.
On the other hand, a State may choose to put its authority behind
one of the cherished aims of American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's hurt. To use the
Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would
be to stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race, color or creed,...
ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the deterbeyond
mination of a State to extend the area of non-discrimination
46
that which the Constitution itself exacts.
43
44
45
46

U.S. at 110.
illustrative cases are collected in Rhyne, Municipal Law 818 n.18 (1957).
Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 850 (1924).
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
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